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A HIGH-LEVEL AFTEREFFECT, AND TWO
WAYS TO EXPLAIN IT
Imagine an experiment in which you show
someone pictures of a computer-generated
face displaying random expressions, rang-
ing from happy, through neutral, to sad.
You tell the participant that she must clas-
sify each picture as being either “happy”
or “sad,” and you note the point on
the expression continuum at which she
switches from mostly-“happy” classifica-
tions to mostly-“sad.” Then, you ask her
to repeat the task, but between each pic-
ture you have her feel, with her hands but
out of sight, the contours of a smiling face
mask. You find that her category bound-
ary has shifted: she now classifies more of
the pictures as “sad.” This result (reported
by Matsumiya, 2013) is an example of
an aftereffect, in which adaptation to one
input (the mask) has altered responses
to subsequent inputs (the images). It is
“high-level” in the sense that the adapting
and test stimuli have little overlap in their
initial sensory encoding (they are pre-
sented in separate modalities). There are at
least two ways to interpret this finding.
A DECISIONAL BIAS?
The presence of the smilingmaskmay have
altered the participant’s strategies or crite-
ria for labeling the expression images. For
instance, she may now be consciously or
unconsciously using the rule: “if in doubt,
say the expression was different from that
of the mask.” This interpretation places the
effect within the extensive catalog of con-
trast effects in the cognitive and social psy-
chological literature. For example, people
judge moderately qualified job applicants
as being less qualified after reading the
résumé of a highly qualified competitor
(Hakel et al., 1970; Wexley et al., 1972).
A PERCEPTUAL BIAS?
Alternatively, feeling the smiling mask
may have changed how the test pictures
look to the participant. Although she uses
the same strategies and criteria to arrive
at her decision, the boundary between
“happy” and “sad” expressions falls at
a different point because her encoding
of the stimuli has changed. According
to this interpretation, Matsumiya’s (2013)
effect is an example of a visual aftereffect,
akin to the temporary illusions induced
by prolonged exposure to a particular
color (Webster, 1996), motion direction
(Addams, 1834; Anstis et al., 1998), ori-
entation (Gibson and Radner, 1937), or
spatial frequency (Blakemore and Sutton,
1969). Such aftereffects can be visually
striking, and have been linked to changes
in the responsiveness of neurons selective
for the properties of the inducing stimulus
(neural adaptation—see, e.g., Kohn, 2007;
Webster, 2012).
Matsumiya’s (2013) effect joins a grow-
ing body of aftereffects between increas-
ingly abstractly-related adapting and test
stimuli. For example, people are more
likely to report an androgynous face as
being male after viewing a female face
(or vice versa; Webster et al., 2004),
or even after viewing female bodies
(Ghuman et al., 2010) or stereotypi-
cally female objects (Javadi and Wee,
2012). Analogous effects occur between
facial images depicting different identities
(Leopold et al., 2001), races, expressions
(Webster et al., 2004), ages (Schweinberger
et al., 2010), and geometric distortions
(Webster and Maclin, 1999). Further
examples of high-level aftereffects abound
outside of face perception: after receiv-
ing downwards-moving tactile stimulation
to their hands, people more often judge
an oscillating visual grating to be drift-
ing upwards (Konkle et al., 2009); after
looking at a looming visual pattern, peo-
ple more often judge a steady auditory
tone to be receding in depth (Kitagawa
and Ichihara, 2002); and after seeing a
series of urban landscapes, people more
often judge semi-rural landscapes to be
“natural” (Greene and Oliva, 2010).
In each of these reports, the afteref-
fect is interpreted as a perceptual bias due
to neural adaptation. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, high-level aftereffects may
provide exciting tools to investigate how
complex stimulus properties are encoded,
just as “low-level” aftereffects have for
simpler stimulus properties (Barlow and
Hill, 1963; Blakemore and Campbell, 1969;
Mollon, 1974; Thompson and Burr, 2009;
Thompson and Burr, although see also
Hegde, 2009 for a note of caution).
Already, face aftereffects have been widely
used to study the encoding of faces (e.g.,
Leopold et al., 2001; Rhodes and Jeffery,
2006; Susilo et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2011;
Storrs and Arnold, 2012; McKone et al.,
2014). If high-level aftereffects are deci-
sional biases, on the other hand, they may
all have a similar origin within amodal
cognitive processes and tell us little about
the representation of any particular stim-
ulus property. So how can one distinguish




THE BIAS MANIFESTS IN A “CRITERION
FREE” TASK
With the exception of Webster and Maclin
(1999), each of the high-level aftereffects
above was demonstrated using a “method
of single stimuli” (MSS). In an MSS task, a
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single test stimulus is shown on each trial
and the observer classifies it as belonging
to one of two categories. The placement
of the category boundary is determined
both by the participant’s sensory evidence
and by her criteria for applying each of the
response labels to that evidence (see Green
and Swets, 1966; Farell and Pelli, 1999;
Kingdom and Prins, 2010). Changes in
criteria can therefore produce exactly the
same pattern of response shifts as changes
in perception, making MSS data ambigu-
ous (Green and Swets, 1966; Gescheider
et al., 1970; Morgan et al., 2011, 2013;
Yarrow et al., 2011). Why then have many
papers in recent years claimed to report
novel perceptual aftereffects on the basis
only of MSS data?
Unfortunately, the best psychophysical
methods to measure perceptual experi-
ence are unsuited to high-level afteref-
fects. Visual appearance can be measured
without relying on semantic labels or
remembered reference stimuli only if there
exists an unadapted (or differently adapted)
location in the visual field. Adaptation
to simple properties, such as orienta-
tion, contrast, and spatial frequency, pro-
duces aftereffects localized to within a
few degrees of the adaptor (Gibson, 1937;
Williams et al., 1982; Ejima and Takahashi,
1985). A test stimulus can then be shown
within the affected region while a reference
stimulus is shown in an unaffected region.
The point of subjective equality (PSE)
between adapted and unadapted locations
is quantified by having the observer adjust
the test to match the reference, indicate
whether or not the two appear the same,
or decide which location contains the
“stronger” signal along some dimension
(see Kingdom and Prins, 2010). This last
task is known as a two-alternative forced-
choice (2AFC, or more generally, nAFC).
Isolating perceptual bias is still not
straightforward. If one shows the same
tilted grating in an adapted and unadapted
location and asks “which is tilted further
clockwise?” (a simple 2AFC), a strategy of
picking the stimulus in the adapted loca-
tion when unsure could produce a shift in
PSE between baseline and adaptation tri-
als (Schneider and Komlos, 2008; Morgan,
2013, 2014; Jogan and Stocker, 2014). Such
problems can be alleviated by elabora-
tions to the nAFC task, such as varying
the reference stimulus from trial-to-trial
so that a perceptual bias predicts opposite
PSE shifts for different reference stimuli
(Morgan, 2013, 2014; Morgan et al., 2013)
and presenting two reference stimuli in
unadapted locations, from which the par-
ticipant selects the one most similar to a
test shown in the adapted location (Jogan
and Stocker, 2014).
While there is no objective way to
measure a subjective perceptual bias,
nAFC methods with multiple reference
stimuli come closest to providing a
measure uncontaminated by decisional
criteria. Unfortunately they are only prac-
tical when the aftereffect is localized
to the adapted location. The position-
dependence of most high-level aftereffects
is unknown, but it seems likely that some
(e.g., cross-modal aftereffects) are spatially
global.
THE BIAS IS MEDIATED BY PROPERTIES OF
EARLY SENSORY NEURONS
Themagnitude of a perceptual bias is often
mediated by the receptive field properties
of early visual neurons. Adaptation at one
retinal location may not affect tests else-
where (see above), or adaptation in one
eye may not affect tests seen with the other
(e.g., McCollough, 1965). The bias may
even occur when the adapting stimulus is
suppressed from awareness (e.g., Blake and
Fox, 1974). These indicators are of limited
use in the present case, though, as high-
level adaptation may not be mediated by
properties of early visual neurons.
THE BIAS IS ACCOMPANIED BY
OBJECTIVELY-MEASURED SENSITIVITY
CHANGES
“Low-level” visual aftereffects are often
accompanied by reduced sensitivity to
detect the adapted properties. For exam-
ple, the image contrast required to detect a
grating pattern is selectively raised for pat-
terns with a similar orientation and spa-
tial frequency to the adaptor (Blakemore
and Campbell, 1969; see also Levinson
and Sekuler, 1980; Krauskopf et al., 1982).
Changes may also be found in discrimina-
tion sensitivity (e.g., Regan and Beverley,
1985; Clifford et al., 2001).
Selective changes in sensitivity near an
adapted value constitute reasonable evi-
dence for changes in sensory encoding—
they often accompany low-level afteref-
fects, are predicted by models based on
neural adaptation (e.g., Blakemore and
Campbell, 1969; Clifford et al., 2001;
Kohn, 2007), and not easily explained in
terms of decisional bias. nAFC tasks can
provide objective measures of sensitivity
(Green and Swets, 1966; Farell and Pelli,
1999) even when there is no unadapted
visual field location. In the domain of
face aftereffects, there is some evidence for
improved discrimination near an adapted
face (Rhodes et al., 2010; Oruc and Barton,
2011), although other researchers have
found no changes in sensitivity (Rhodes
et al., 2007; Ng et al., 2008).
THE BIAS FAILS TO MANIFEST IN AN “EL
GRECO TASK”
Since the opthalmologist Beritens pro-
posed that an astigmatism was to blame
for the oddly elongated figures painted by
the artist El Greco, many have pointed
out the fallacy in his theory: any opti-
cal distortion El Greco experienced must
have applied equally to both his subjects
and his own paintings (Rock, 1966; Anstis,
2002; Firestone, 2013). Likewise, if an
adaptation-induced bias is a literal change
in how things look, it should apply equally
to the test and to any reference against
which the observer judges it (Firestone
and Scholl, 2013). After adaptation, an
observer could be shown a test stimulus,
then asked to adjust or select a reference
stimulus to match it. Any bias shown in
this “El Greco task” is likely of a cognitive




THE BIAS HAS SIMILAR TEMPORAL
DYNAMICS TO A PERCEPTUAL ONE
Several authors (Leopold et al., 2005;
Ghuman et al., 2010; Matsumiya, 2013)
show that the magnitudes of their respec-
tive aftereffects increase logarithmically
with the duration of the adapting stimulus.
This is similar to the temporal dynam-
ics of tilt (Magnussen and Johnsen, 1986)
and motion (Hershenson, 1989) afteref-
fects, and is presented as evidence that the
high-level aftereffects in question share a
common mechanism with low-level after-
effects. A priori, the fact that two pairs of
variables are related to one another by sim-
ilar functions is poor evidence that they
are subserved by similar mechanisms (a
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sum of money accumulating compound
interest also increases logarithmically with
time). Temporal dynamics may turn out
to have diagnostic value, but only if effects
deemed perceptual on other grounds have
reliably different temporal dynamics from
those deemed decisional. These data do
not yet exist.
THE BIAS MANIFESTS IN SOME CONDITIONS
BUT NOT OTHERS
Kitagawa and Ichihara (2002) find that
although viewing a looming visual pattern
causes participants to judge a steady audi-
tory tone as receding in depth, hearing a
tone increasing in volume has no effect on
visual judgements. The authors argue that
this selectivity for particular adaptor-test
pairings indicates a perceptual origin (Van
der Burg et al. (2013) present a similar
argument). This relies on the assumption
that all adaptor-test pairings should be
equally effective in inducing shifts in deci-
sional criteria—it is not obvious why this
should be the case.
CONCLUSION
Much of the interest in high-level afteref-
fects depends on claims that, like colored
afterimages or motion aftereffects, they
involve literal changes in how the world
looks, feels or sounds. Such changes in
sensory encoding may help us understand
how the brain represents complex stimu-
lus properties and integrates information
across modalities. However, most high-
level aftereffects have so far been demon-
strated only as biases in how people classify
stimuli during method-of-single-stimulus
tasks, and are therefore equally consistent
with changes in amodal decision-making
processes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to Derek Arnold, Michael
Morgan, Josh Solomon and Kielan Yarrow
for conversations on these subjects, and for
helpful comments on earlier versions of
this manuscript.
REFERENCES
Addams, R. (1834). An account of a peculiar optical
phenomenon seen after having looked at a moving
body. Lond. Edinb. Philos. Mag. J. Sci. 5, 373–374.
Anstis, S. (2002). Was El Greco astigmatic? Leonardo
35, 208–208. doi: 10.1162/00240940252940612
Anstis, S., Verstraten, F. A., andMather, G. (1998). The
motion aftereffect. Trends Cogn. Sci. 2, 111–117.
doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01142-5
Barlow, H. B., and Hill, R. M. (1963). Evidence for
a physiological explanation of the waterfall phe-
nomenon and figural after-effects. Nature 200,
134–1347. doi: 10.1038/2001345a0
Blake, R., and Fox, R. (1974). Adaptation to invisible
gratings and the site of binocular rivalry suppres-
sion. Nature 249, 488–490. doi: 10.1038/249488a0
Blakemore, C., and Sutton, P. (1969). Size adapta-
tion: a new aftereffect. Science 166, 245–247. doi:
10.1126/science.166.3902.245
Blakemore, C. T., and Campbell, F. W. (1969). On
the existence of neurones in the human visual sys-
tem selectively sensitive to the orientation and size
of retinal images. J. Physiol. 203, 237–260. doi:
10.1113/jphysiol.1969.sp008862
Clifford, C. W., Wyatt, A. M., Arnold, D. H., Smith,
S. T., and Wenderoth, P. (2001). Orthogonal
adaptation improves orientation discrimination.
Vision Res. 41, 151–159. doi: 10.1016/S0042-
6989(00)00248-0
Ejima, Y., and Takahashi, S. (1985). Effect of local-
ized grating adaptation as a function of sepa-
ration along the length axis between test and
adaptation areas. Vision Res. 25, 1701–1707. doi:
10.1016/0042-6989(85)90142-7
Farell, B., and Pelli, D. G. (1999). “Psychophysical
methods, or how to measure a threshold and
why,” in Vision Research: A Practical Guide to
Laboratory Methods, eds R. H. S. Carpenter and
J. G. Robson (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press), 129–137.
Firestone, C. (2013). On the origin and status of the
“El Greco fallacy.” Perception 42, 672–674. doi:
10.1068/p7488
Firestone, C., and Scholl, B. (2013). “Top-down”
effects where none should be found: the El Greco
fallacy in perception research. Psychol. Sci. 25,
38–46. doi: 10.1177/0956797613485092
Gescheider, G. A., Herman, D. D., and Phillips, J. N.
(1970). Criterion shifts in the measurement of tac-
tile masking. Percept. Psychophys. 8, 433–436. doi:
10.3758/BF03207041
Ghuman, A. S.,McDaniel, J. R., andMartin, A. (2010).
Face adaptation without a face. Curr. Biol. 20,
32–36. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2009.10.077
Gibson, J. J. (1937). Adaptation, after-effect, and
contrast in the perception of tilted lines. II.
Simultaneous contrast and the areal restriction
of the after-effect. J. Exp. Psychol. 20, 553. doi:
10.1037/h0057585
Gibson, J. J., and Radner,M. (1937). Adaptation, after-
effect and contrast in the perception of tilted lines.
I. Quantitative studies. J. Exp. Psychol. 20, 453.
Green, D. M., and Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal Detection
Theory and Psychophysics. New York, NY: Wiley.
Greene, M. R., and Oliva, A. (2010). High-level
aftereffects to global scene properties. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 36, 1430–1442.
doi: 10.1037/a0019058
Hakel, M. D., Ohnesorge, J. P., and Dunnette, M. D.
(1970). Interviewer evaluations of job applicants’
resumes as a function of the qualifications of the
immediately preceding applicants: an examination
of contrast effects. J. Appl. Psychol. 54, 27–30. doi:
10.1037/h0028650
Hegde, J. (2009). How reliable is the pattern
adaptation technique? A modeling study. J.
Neurophysiol. 102, 2245–2252. doi: 10.1152/jn.002
16.2009
Hershenson, M. (1989). Duration, time constant, and
decay of the linear motion aftereffect as a function
of inspection duration. Percept. psychophys. 45,
251–257. doi: 10.3758/BF03210704
Javadi, A. H., and Wee, N. (2012). Cross-category
adaptation: objects produce gender adaptation in
the perception of faces. PLoS ONE 7:e46079. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0046079
Jogan, M., and Stocker, A. A. (2014). A new two-
alternative forced choice method for the unbi-
ased characterization of perceptual bias and dis-
criminability. J. Vis. 14, 1–18. doi: 10.1167/
14.3.20
Kingdom, F. A. A., and Prins, N. (2010). Psychophysics:
A Practical Introduction. London: Academic Press.
Kitagawa, N., and Ichihara, S. (2002). Hearing visual
motion in depth. Nature 416, 172–174. doi:
10.1038/416172a
Kohn, A. (2007). Visual adaptation: physiology, mech-
anisms, and functional benefits. J. Neurophysiol.
97, 3155–3164. doi: 10.1152/jn.00086.2007
Konkle, T., Wang, Q., Hayward, V., and Moore, C.
I. (2009). Motion aftereffects transfer between
touch and vision. Curr. Biol. 19, 745–750. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2009.03.035
Krauskopf, J., Williams, D. R., and Heeley, D.
W. (1982). Cardinal directions of color space.
Vision Res. 22, 1123–1131. doi: 10.1016/0042-
6989(82)90077-3
Leopold, D. A., Rhodes, G., Muller, K. M., and Jeffery,
L. (2005). The dynamics of visual adaptation to
faces. Proc. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 272, 897–904 doi:
10.1098/rspb.2004.3022
Leopold, D., O’Toole, A., Vetter, T., and Blanz,
V. (2001). Prototype-referenced shape encoding
revealed by high-level after effects. Nat. Neurosci.
26, 40–46. doi: 10.1038/82947
Levinson, E., and Sekuler, R. (1980). A two-
dimensional analysis of direction-specific adapta-
tion. Vision Res. 20, 103–107. doi: 10.1016/0042-
6989(80)90151-0
Magnussen, S., and Johnsen, T. (1986). Temporal
aspects of spatial adaptation. A study of the
tilt aftereffect. Vision Res. 26, 661–672. doi:
10.1016/0042-6989(86)90014-3
Matsumiya, K. (2013). Seeing a haptically explored
face: visual facial-expression aftereffect from hap-
tic adaptation to a face. Psychol. Sci. 24, 2088–2098.
doi: 10.1177/0956797613486981
McCollough, C. (1965). Color adaptation of edge
detectors in the human visual system. Science
149, 1115–1116. doi: 10.1126/science.149.36
88.1115
McKone, E., Jeffery, L., Boeing, A., Clifford, C.
W., and Rhodes, G. (2014). Face identity after-
effects increase monotonically with adaptor
extremity over, but not beyond, the range
of natural faces. Vision Res. 98, 1–13. doi:
10.1016/j.visres.2014.01.007
Mollon, J. (1974). After-effects and the brain.New Sci.
61, 479–482.
Morgan, M., Dillenburger, B., Raphael, S., and
Solomon, J. A. (2011). Observers can voluntarily
shift their psychometric functions without losing
sensitivity. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 74, 185–193.
doi: 10.3758/s13414-011-0222-7
Morgan, M. J. (2013). Sustained attention is not nec-
essary for velocity adaptation. J. Vis. 13, 1–11. doi:
10.1167/13.8.26
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 157 | 3
Storrs Are high-level aftereffects perceptual?
Morgan, M. J. (2014). A bias-free measure of
retinotopic tilt adaptation. J. Vis. 14, 1–9. doi:
10.1167/4.1.7
Morgan, M., Melmoth, D., and Solomon, J. A.
(2013). Linking hypotheses underlying Class A and
Class B methods. Vis. Neurosci. 30, 197–206. doi:
10.1017/S095252381300045X
Ng, M., Boynton, G. M., and Fine, I. (2008). Face
adaptation does not improve performance on
search or discrimination tasks. J. Vis. 8, 1–20. doi:
10.1167/8.1.1
Oruc, I., and Barton, J. J. S. (2011). Adaptation
improves discrimination of face identity. Proc. Biol.
Sci. 278, 2591–2597. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2010.2480
Regan, D., and Beverley, K. I. (1985). Postadaptation
orientation discrimination. J. Opt. Soc. Am. A 2,
147–155. doi: 10.1364/JOSAA.2.000147
Rhodes, G., and Jeffery, L. (2006). Adaptive norm-
based coding of facial identity. Vision Res. 46,
2977–2987. doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2006.03.002
Rhodes, G., Maloney, L. T., Turner, J., and Ewing, L.
(2007). Adaptive face coding and discrimination
around the average face. Vision Res. 47, 974–989.
doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2006.12.010
Rhodes, G., Watson, T. L., Jeffery, L., and Clifford,
C. W. G. (2010). Perceptual adaptation helps
us identify faces. Vision Res. 50, 963–968. doi:
10.1016/j.visres.2010.03.003
Rock, I. (1966). The Nature of Perceptual Adaptation.
Oxford: Basic Books.
Schneider, K. A., and Komlos, M. (2008). Attention
biases decisions but does not alter appearance.
J. Vis. 8, 1–10. doi: 10.1167/8.15.3
Schweinberger, S. R., Zäske, R., Walther, C., Golle, J.,
Kovács, G., and Wiese, H. (2010). Young without
plastic surgery: perceptual adaptation to the age of
female and male faces. Vision Res. 50, 2570–2576.
doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2010.08.017
Storrs, K. R., and Arnold, D. H. (2012). Not all face
aftereffects are equal. Vision Res. 64, 7–16. doi:
10.1016/j.visres.2012.04.020
Susilo, T., McKone, E., and Edwards, M. (2010). What
shape are the neural response functions underlying
opponent coding in face space? A psychophys-
ical investigation. Vision Res. 50, 300–314. doi:
10.1016/j.visres.2009.11.016
Thompson, P., and Burr, D. (2009). Visual
aftereffects. Curr. Biol. 19, R11–R14. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2008.10.014
Van der Burg, E., Alais, D., and Cass, J. (2013).
Rapid recalibration to audiovisual asyn-
chrony. J. Neurosci. 33, 14633–14637. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1182-13.2013
Webster, M. (2012). Evolving concepts of sensory
adaptation. F1000 Biol. Rep. 4:21. doi: 10.3410/
B4-21
Webster, M. A. (1996). Human colour perception
and its adaptation. Netw. Comput. Neural Syst. 7,
587–634. doi: 10.1088/0954-898X/7/4/002
Webster, M. A., Kaping, D., Mizokami, Y., and
Duhamel, P. (2004). Adaptation to natural
facial categories. Nature 428, 557–561. doi:
10.1038/nature02420
Webster, M. A., and Maclin, O. H. (1999). Figural
aftereffects in the perception of faces. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 6, 647–653. doi: 10.3758/BF03212974
Wexley, K. N., Yukl, G. A., Kovacs, S. Z., and Sanders,
R. E. (1972). Importance of contrast effects in
employment interviews. J. Appl. Psychol. 56, 45.
doi: 10.1037/h0032132
Williams, D. W., Wilson, H. R., and Cowan, J.
D. (1982). Localized effects of spatial frequency
adaptation. J. Opt. Soc. Am. 72, 878–887. doi:
10.1364/JOSA.72.000878
Yarrow, K., Jahn, N., Durant, S., and Arnold,
D. H. (2011). Shifts of criteria or neural
timing? The assumptions underlying tim-
ing perception studies. Conscious. Cogn.
20, 1518–1531. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.
07.003
Zhao, C., Seriès, P., Hancock, P. J. B., and
Bednar, J. A. (2011). Similar neural adapta-
tion mechanisms underlying face gender and
tilt aftereffects. Vision Res. 51, 2021–2030. doi:
10.1016/j.visres.2011.07.014
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 11 October 2014; paper pending published:
12 January 2015; accepted: 31 January 2015; published
online: 19 February 2015.
Citation: Storrs KR (2015) Are high-level aftereffects
perceptual? Front. Psychol. 6:157. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.00157
This article was submitted to Perception Science, a
section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2015 Storrs. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accor-
dance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribu-
tion or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 157 | 4
